The Strait That Could Choke India's Economy

History has repeatedly shown that great powers are shaped as much by the seas they secure as by the borders they defend. Today, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a narrow maritime passage between Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea, has emerged as one of the world's most dangerous geopolitical flashpoints. As Yemen's Houthi rebels, backed by Iran, intensify attacks on commercial shipping amid the wider US-Iran confrontation, this chokepoint risks becoming an economic chokehold for India. With nearly 85% of its crude oil imported and almost 95% of its trade by volume moving through sea routes, India cannot afford to remain a passive observer. If it aspires to be a leading power, it must lead efforts to secure the Bab el-Mandeb.

Connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, the Bab el-Mandeb carries nearly 10 to 15% of global trade and serves as the gateway to the Suez Canal, through which a significant share of Europe-Asia commerce passes. Since late 2023, repeated Houthi drone and missile attacks have forced ships to divert around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing freight costs, insurance premiums and transit times. While US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian, the EU's Operation Aspides and naval deployments have prevented a complete collapse of maritime traffic, they have treated the symptoms rather than the disease. The underlying conflict in Yemen continues to threaten one of the world's most vital sea lanes.

For India, the consequences are immediate. Every disruption raises fuel prices, widens the current account deficit, weakens the rupee and fuels inflation. Farmers pay more for diesel, industries face rising logistics costs, exporters lose competitiveness, and consumers bear the burden of higher prices. Energy security is no longer merely an economic concern; it is a pillar of national security and sustainable growth. A simultaneous disruption of the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb would severely test India's economic resilience.

New Delhi's response has been professional but largely tactical rather than strategic. The Indian Navy has successfully escorted merchant vessels, countered piracy in the Gulf of Aden and safeguarded Indian shipping. Yet escort missions alone cannot substitute for a long-term maritime strategy. India's vision of being a "net security provider" in the Indian Ocean must evolve beyond crisis management into shaping the regional security architecture itself.

The international response has exposed a broader failure. Great powers have prioritised military deterrence while neglecting political solutions to the Yemen conflict. The Red Sea has increasingly become another arena of proxy rivalry involving the United States, Iran, China and Russia. China has expanded its strategic footprint through its base in Djibouti, while European powers focus primarily on protecting their own commerce. Outsourcing the security of sea lanes vital to India's economy would be inconsistent with the strategic autonomy that New Delhi proudly champions.

India, however, enjoys a unique diplomatic advantage. It maintains productive relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel and the African littoral states without being viewed as a partisan actor. This credibility, reinforced through initiatives such as SAGAR, MAHASAGAR and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, positions India to bridge competing interests rather than deepen rivalries. If the Quad seeks to remain more than a diplomatic slogan, its vision of a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific must extend meaningfully to the western Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. Equally, the principles of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea demand that global maritime commons remain free from coercion by either states or non-state actors.

India should therefore move decisively. In the immediate term, it must strengthen naval deployments, institutionalise convoy protection, expand maritime domain awareness through drones and satellites, and deepen intelligence sharing with like-minded partners. Over the medium term, New Delhi should lead a broader maritime security framework involving the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, Gulf countries and African coastal states to complement existing international efforts. Over the long term, India must reduce its strategic vulnerability by expanding strategic petroleum reserves, accelerating renewable energy and green hydrogen, diversifying energy imports, strengthening indigenous shipbuilding and modernising its Navy.

Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that sea power shapes the destiny of nations. In the twenty-first century, that power lies not in conquest but in keeping global sea lanes open, secure and governed by international law. The Bab el-Mandeb is not merely a distant strait; it is a gateway through which India's energy security, trade and economic aspirations increasingly flow. In turbulent waters, India must not merely navigate events. It must help shape the course they take.