Investigation finds loco pilot’s incompetence behind fatal Bilaspur MEMU-goods train crash

The Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) has blamed the rail administration for the tragic train collision in Chhattisgarh on November 4, 2025, citing the deployment of an unfit loco pilot as a key factor. The CRS investigation, submitted to the Railway Board, revealed that the loco pilot assigned to MEMU train No. 68733 had failed the mandatory aptitude test and relied on telephonic guidance while operating the train , raising serious concerns about safety compliance.

The collision, which occurred in the Bilaspur division , involved the rear-end impact of a local passenger MEMU train with a goods train. The accident resulted in the deaths of 12 people , including the loco pilot, and left 19 passengers injured .

Brijesh Kumar Mishra,

Commissioner of Railway Safety, South Eastern Circle, Kolkata, stated in the report that the loco pilot deployed on MEMU train No. 68733 had failed the mandatory aptitude test conducted on June 9, 2025. During the run, he made telephonic calls to the Chief Loco Inspector (CLI) even for minor operational issues, highlighting a lack of knowledge, confidence, and essential skills such as rule knowledge, decision-making, and reaction time. Observations from the Assistant Loco Pilot and senior inspectors, along with procedural deficiencies in his Certificate of Competency, indicated that the formal qualification process had not been properly followed, allowing an unqualified individual to operate the train.

Analysis of call records revealed two specific instances where the loco pilot contacted the CLI for routine safety instructions. At 10:20:14 hours, while the train was standing at Gatora (GTW) station, guidance was sought on how to reset the alarm chain-pulling system (ACP). Another call at 13:11:32 hours was made to inquire about releasing the parking brake while the train was stationary at Gad station. According to the CRS, these were routine matters that the loco pilot should have been able to resolve independently, with the troubleshooting directory provided to all loco pilots.

The report also highlighted deficiencies in the Certificate of Competency issued to the loco pilot by the Senior Divisional Electrical Engineer (Operations) of Bilaspur Division, suggesting that proper procedure had not been followed and that the pilot may not have been fully competent to operate MEMU trains.

CRS Mishra emphasized that the MEMU train, being a single-man working train , requires passing the aptitude test as per Railway Board norms. While SECR officials argued that the loco pilot could be deployed with an ALP as done in regular coaching trains, the CRS rejected this, stating that Railway Board guidelines clearly prohibit deployment of unqualified pilots. Furthermore, it was noted that MEMU trains running over 200 km require an assistant loco pilot, irrespective of whether the train is driven by a motorman or a loco pilot .

Several systemic issues were identified, including a shortfall of 40 qualified loco pilots in SECR, with only 102 out of the 142 required having passed the aptitude test. Administrative instructions mandating ALPs to maintain one hand on the RS valve while passing yellow signals were also reiterated to ensure immediate emergency braking if required.

To prevent future accidents, the CRS recommended the introduction of an Advanced Auxiliary Warning System (AAWS) similar to that used in EMU rakes in the Mumbai suburban section. The system monitors train speed according to signal aspects and applies emergency brakes automatically if a signal violation occurs. CRS Mishra urged that only loco pilots who have passed the aptitude test be deployed and recommended that the Railway Board ensure adequate manpower for safe MEMU operations.

The CRS report underscores the critical need for strict adherence to safety norms and regulatory compliance in MEMU operations, aiming to prevent recurrence of tragedies such as the November 4 collision.