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CRPF plans commando training school at Karregutta Hills, former Naxal stronghold
The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) is plannin g to establish a commando training school at the rugged Karregutta Hills, straddling the Chhattisgarh-Telangana border. This area, also known as the Korgotalu Hills (KGH), was the site of one of the most significant anti-Naxal operations in recent years, where 31 Maoists were killed between April and May 2025.
Officials confirmed that a detailed survey is underway to identify the most suitable location within the hilly terrain, which stretches approximately 60 km in length and 5–20 km in width. The landscape, marked by caves, bunkers, and dense wildlife including bees, bats, and bears, presents both challenges and strategic opportunities for commando training.
The proposed training facility will follow the successful ‘Operation Black Forest’, a three-week joint operation by CRPF , its jungle warfare commando unit CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) , and Chhattisgarh Police . The offensive, described by officials as the "biggest ever" against Maoists, aimed to neutralise insurgent strongholds and eliminate the threat posed by Left Wing Extremism (LWE) , a campaign the Union government intends to end by March 2026.
"Post-operation, extensive sanitisation has been carried out to neutralise hidden Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and bombs. That process is nearing completion, and the training school plan will ensure the area remains secure and functional," a senior officer told PTI.
The establishment of a permanent training base reflects a broader strategic approach: consolidating gains after anti-insurgency operations. History has shown that victory over insurgent groups is often temporary unless reinforced by a continued security presence. Officers noted that without permanent monitoring, splinter groups or regrouping cadres could exploit any security vacuum, as has happened in other regions.
Logistics remain a key consideration. The KGH experiences scorching summer temperatures exceeding 45°C and faces basic infrastructure challenges such as water and electricity supply. Officers are reviewing these issues alongside operational and construction plans, which will be finalised once the hurdles are addressed.
Despite the difficult terrain, routes have been established during Operation Black Forest, improving accessibility without compromising the challenging conditions that make it ideal for commando training. Officials also hinted at a potential tourism component, suggesting that a secure base could facilitate controlled public access to parts of the KGH.
The scale of the operation underscores the strategic significance of the hills. Security forces recovered 450 IEDs, 35 high-quality weapons, and 2 tonnes of explosives, while neutralising 250 caves and 214 bunkers. Intelligence suggested that around 350 Maoists, including top commanders of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) Battalion No.1 of the Telangana State Committee (TSC) , had entrenched themselves in the hills for over two years. The area also functioned as an arms manufacturing hub and the Maoists’ main armoury.
The plan to convert a former Naxal stronghold into a commando training school carries both tactical and symbolic weight. Strategically, it demonstrates the government’s commitment to consolidating counter-insurgency gains and leveraging difficult terrains for elite force training. Such schools provide specialized instruction in jungle warfare, high-altitude operations, survival skills, and neutralizing improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Troops trained in these environments can respond more effectively to ambushes, navigate challenging terrain, and carry out precision operations, reducing casualties and increasing mission success. A permanent base in a former insurgent area also ensures sustained security, preventing Maoists or splinter groups from regrouping.
Beyond tactical advantages, the school serves as a hub for joint exercises with state police, intelligence agencies, and paramilitary forces, fostering coordination and readiness for multi-agency counter-insurgency operations. It allows forces to study local terrain, identify potential hideouts, and pre-empt insurgent tactics. While challenges like extreme weather, difficult geography, and infrastructural limitations remain, a well-executed training school enhances operational capabilities, strengthens long-term security, and signals the government’s commitment to holding previously insurgent-dominated regions.
Moreover, the dual plan to open parts of the hills for tourism while maintaining a high-security training facility highlights a nuanced approach, balancing development and security. Yet, operationalizing such a facility will require constant vigilance to prevent any resurgence of insurgent activity, as the Maoists have historically adapted and regrouped quickly in response to security interventions.
The initiative signals a shift in India’s counter-insurgency strategy: from reactive operations to preventive and institutionalized measures. By embedding elite forces in former insurgent zones, the government aims to create permanent deterrence while also exploring opportunities to integrate local development and controlled tourism.
